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Despite	the	bright	sun,	dew	was	still	dripping	from	the	chrysanthemums	in	the	garden.	
On	the	bamboo	fences,	and	criss-cross	hedges,	I	saw	tatters	of	spiderwebs;	and	where	
the	threads	were	broken	the	raindrops	hung	on	them	like	strings	of	white	pearls.	I	was	
greatly	moved	and	delighted.	…Later	I	described	to	people	how	beautiful	it	all	was.	
What	impressed	me	most	was	that	they	were	not	impressed.	[Sei	Shonagon	1991:	]!	
	
…the	most	gorgeously	coloured	butterflies	in	the	world.	Fine	specimens	of	the	male	are	
more	than	seven	inches	across	the	wings,	which	are	velvety	black	and	fiery	orange,	the	
latter	colour	replacing	the	green	of	the	allied	species.	The	beauty	and	brilliancy	of	this	
insect	 are	 indescribable,	 and	 none	 but	 a	 naturalist	 can	 understand	 the	 intense	
excitement	 I	 experienced	when	 I	 at	 length	 captured	 it.	On	 taking	 it	out	of	my	net	and	
opening	 the	glorious	wings,	my	heart	began	 to	beat	 violently,	 the	blood	 rushed	 to	my	
head,	 and	 I	 felt	 much	 more	 like	 fainting	 than	 I	 have	 done	 when	 in	 apprehension	 of	
immediate	 death.	 I	 had	 a	 headache	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 day,	 so	 great	 was	 the	 excitement	
produced	by	what	will	 appear	 to	most	people	a	very	 inadequate	 cause.	 	Alfred	Russel	
Wallace,	[1877:		II:51]		
	
I. 	
	
Several	 themes	 important	 for	 the	 philosophy	 of	 art	 touched	 upon	 here:	 the	 force	 of	
aesthetic	 experience;	 the	 impulse	 to	 try	 to	 share	 it	 with	 others;	 anxiety	 or	
disappointment	over	the	communicability	of	the	experience	and	of	course	the	beauty	of	
nature	 in	 form	 and	 colour.	 	 In	 this	 talk	 I	 want	 to	 enter	 a	 plea	 for	 the	 still	 rather	
unpopular	naturalistic	approach	to	aesthetics	in	the	case	addressed	to	its	evolutionary	
origins	and	significance.		
	
In	the	1870s,	Darwin	brooded	on	the	‘taste	for	beauty’	apparent	across	numerous	taxa,	
wondered	about	 its	 relationship	 to	human	artistry	and	proposed	 that	beauty	 in	 living	
nature	was	 related	 to	 sexual	 selection	which	 he	 distinguished	 from	 natural	 selection.		
His	 position	 was	 contested	 by	 the	 co-discoverer	 of	 natural	 selection,	 Alfred	 Russel	
Wallace.	Wallace,	for	the	reasons	discussed	below	thought	this	unlikely,	maintaining	that	
all	 living	 forms	 were	 either	 accidental	 or	 functional	 in	 promoting	 survival,	 and	 that	
beauty	could	only	be	an	indicator	of	good	health	and	fertility.		Recently	both	Darwinian	
and	Wallacean	approaches	have	been	revived	in	books	by	Miller	[2000]	Dutton	[2009],	
and	Davies	[2012].		In	this	paper	I	want	to	investigate	more	deeply	the	Darwinian	theory	
of	selection	for	beauty,	a	topic	they	touch	upon,	but	which	is	far	less	well	understood	by	
evolutionary	biologists	than	they	imply.		I	propose	to	explore	the		
	analogies	 between	 ornament	 in	 living	 nature,	 which	 serve	 as	 advertisement	 and	 is	
explicable	on	evolutionary	grounds,	and	the	human	practices	of	making	and	presenting	
beautiful	objects	and	the	responses	of	liking	and	wanting	them.		
	
I	 have	 called	my	 approach	 here	 ‘another	 Darwinian	 aesthetics’	 to	 distinguish	 it	 from	
views	 that	 extrapolate	 too	 quickly	 from	 the	 case	 of	 the	 peacock’s	 tail,	 a	 phenomenon	
that	 is	 in	 fact	 rather	 poorly	 understood.	 	 These	 include	 	 Dutton’s	 view	 that	 artistic	
2	
	
productions	 are	 costly	 displays	 that	 attract	 according	 to	 the	 ‘handicap’	 principle	 and	
Miller’s	 view	 that	 artistry	 is	 a	 a	 male	 display	 feature	 that	 was	 selected	 for	 in	 the	
Environment	 of	 Early	 Adaptation.	 	 Instead	 I	 follow	 and	 develop	 the	 view	 of	 the	
ornithologists	Nancy	Burley	 (1998)	and	 	Richard	Prum	[2012,	2013]	on	biotic	display	
and	relate	their	schemes	to	human	artistry					
	
Before	 getting	 into	 the	 details	 and	 aware	 that	 there	 is	 much	 skepticism	 about	 any	
appeals	to	evolution	or	neuroscience	 in	connection	with	asesthetics,	 I	want	to	want	to	
make	some	general	comments	on	this	approach				
	
			
I. Philosophy	of	Art	vs.	Aesthetics		
	
	
It	 is	 common	 to	 reproach	evolutionary	aesthetics	with	a	 failure	 to	address	 the	central	
questions	of	aesthetics.i	 ‘Art,’	says	Alva	Noe,	‘isn’t	really	a	phenomenon	at	all,	not	in	the	
sense	that	photosynthesis	or	eyesight	are	phenomena	that	stand	in	need	of	explanation.	
Art	is,	rather,	a	mode	of	investigation,	a	style	of	research,	into	what	we	are.	‘	‘The	trouble	
with	evolutionary	theories	of	art,’	he	goes	on	to	say,	‘is	that	they	tend	to	be	empty.	They	
don’t	tell	us	why	we	make	art	or	why	art	is	valuable	for	us…they	don’t	even	get	so	far	as	
to	say	something	substantial	about	art.’	[2015:	59]	‘Art	offers	revelation,	transformation,	
organization’	[ibid.	62].	It	is	not	technology.			
	
The	view	that	art	is,	well,	irreducibly	artificial,	not	a	biological	phenomenon,	goes	back	
to	Hegel.	In	his	Introductory	Lectures	on	Aesthetics	of	1803,	Hegel	insisted	on	narrowing	
the	field	of	Aesthetics	for	his	purposes	from	the	science	of	sensation	and	feeling	in	
general,	a	Kantian	usage,	to	the	science	–in	the	German	sense,	a	rigorous,	systematic	
enquiry	aiming	at	knowledge---,	of	human	artistic	productions.	Although	he	did	not	
exclude	the	decorative	arts	from	the	category	of	objects	of	aesthetics,	including	‘the	
rude	adornments	of	the	savage’	and	‘the	splendour	of	the	temple	with	its	untold	wealth	
of	decoration,’	his	focus	was	on	European	painting,	sculpture,	music	and	poetry	and	the	
beauty	to	be		found	therein.	
What	he	did	especially	intend	to	exclude	in	the	Lectures	was	the	beauty	of	nature.	In	
common	life,	he	said,	‘we	are	in	the	habit	of	speaking	of	a	beautiful	colour,	a	beautiful	
sky,	a	beautiful	river,	and	moreover,	of	beautiful	flowers,	beautiful	animals,	and	above	
all,	of	beautiful	human	beings.’			Perhaps	these	things	were	beautiful,	but,	said	Hegel,	
‘the	beauty	of	art	is	higher	than	the	beauty	of	nature.’	This,	he	explained,	is	because	it	is	
the	free	production	of	a	self-conscious	intellectual	being,	a	being	with	a	mind,	capable	of	
perceiving	the	truth.	The	human	imagination,	the	‘free	activity	of	fancy’	outstrips	the	
form	building	powers	of	nature.	It	liberates,	he	said,	‘the	real	import	of	the	appearances	
from	the	semblance	and	deception	of	this	bad	and	fleeting	world,	and	imparts	to	
phenomenal	semblances	a	higher	reality,	born	of	mind.’		Fine	art,	like	religion	and	
philosophy,	is	‘a	mode	of	revealing	to	consciousness	and	bringing	to	utterance	the	
Divine	Nature’	[2004:	3-9]			
Hegel	insisted	that	there	had	never	been	(implying	that	there	never	could	be	a	science	
of	natural	beauty),	that	the	science	of	nature	was	addressed	to	the	useful;	to	the	
medicinal	properties	of	plants	and	minerals.	By	contrast,	although	fine	art	was	
associated	with	deception,	with	appearance,	and	with	entertainment	and	diversion	from	
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the	cares	of	life,	seemingly	rendering	it	unfit	for	scientific	treatment	the	Lectures	would	
dispel	that	superficial	impression:	the	science	of	the	aesthetic	henceforth	was	addressed	
to	fine	art.		
For	all	its	praise	of	freedom	and	mentality,	Hegel	departed	explicitly	from	Kant	whose	
philosophy	of	beauty	was	addressed	to	the	beautiful	in	nature	and	the	decorative	arts,	
in	both	cases,	things	whose	‘sole	purpose’	seem	to	be	to	‘be	beheld	from	the	outside.’	
Consider,	he	said,	
	flowers,	blossoms,	even	the	shapes	of	entire	plants,	or	consider	the	grace	we	see	in	the	
structure	of	various	types	of	animals,	which	is	unnecessary	for	their	own	use	but	is	
selected,	as	it	were,	for	our	taste.	Consider	above	all	the	variety	and	harmonious	
combination	of	colours,	so	likeable	and	charming	to	our	eyes	(as	in	pheasants,	
[molluscs],	insects,	down	to	the	commonest	flowers):	since	these	colours	have	to	do	
merely	with	the	surface	and...have	nothing	to	do	with..[what]	might	be	needed	for	these	
creatures’	inner	purposes—it	seems	their	sole	purpose	is	to	be	beheld	from	the	outside.’	
(1987,	V:	347-8).	
	
The	 existence	 of	 these	 objects	was	 profoundly	 puzzling	 to	Kant	 because	 he	 could	 not	
bring	himself	to	believe	either	that	God	or	nature	had	in	fact	produced	anything	whose	
sole	 purpose	was	 to	 be	 looked	 at	 from	 the	 outside.	 	 Kant’s	 God	was	 a	moral	 idea	 of	
practical	 reason	 and	 the	 building	 forces	 of	 nature,	 being	 ‘blind’	 could	 not	 construct	
objects	according	to	a	design,	either	for	utility	or	for	beauty.	He	goes	round	and	round	
with	this	problem	in	the	Critique	of	Judgement	without	really	solving	it.		
	
The	 contemporary	 discipline	 of	 philosophy	 of	 art	 has	 followed	 Hegel’s	 lead	 against	
Kant’s.	 	 In	 Richard	Wollheim’s	Art	 and	 its	 Objects,	 Hegel’s	 differentiation	 becomes	 an	
accusation:	that	Kant’s	point	of	departure	introduced	confusion.		Wollheim’s	agenda	was	
the	characterization	of	the	‘aesthetic	attitude’	and	while,	like	Kant’s	‘taste,’	the	aesthetic	
attitude	was	 free	of	 practical	 considerations	of	 utility,	Wollheim	 claimed	 that	what	he	
called	‘uncontrived	nature’	could	be	regarded	aesthetically	only	in	a	derived	sense.		
	
Wollheim	was	definite	on	 this	point:	 ‘A	serious	distortion,’	he	says,	 ‘	 is	 introduced	 into	
many	accounts	of	the	aesthetic	attitude	by	taking	as	central	to	it	cases	which	are	really	
peripheral	or	secondary,’	including	Kant’s	rose	or	Edward	Bullough’s	fog	at	sea.		[1980:	
96]	He	compared	our	taking	such	experiences	as	focal	instances	of	the	aesthetic	attitude	
to	 ‘an	 attempt	 to	 explicate	 our	 understanding	 of	 language	 by	 reference	 to	 the	
experiences	we	might	 have	 in	 listening	 to	 a	 parrot	 talking’	 [ibid.	 97].	 He	 admits	 that	
‘once	the	aesthetic	attitude	has	been	established	on	the	basis	of	objects	produced	under	
the	concept	of	art,	we	can	then	extend	it	beyond	this	base,’	and	he	gives	as	an	example	
Paul	Valery’s	meditations	on	the	sea	shell	iiand,	at	the	turn	of	the	previous	century,	‘the	
wholesale	transfer	of	primitive	artefacts	from	ethnographical	collections	…to	museums	
of	fine	art,	where,	it	was		now	thought,	they	were	more	appropriately	located‘	[ibid.	98].		
Where	 Hegel	wanted	 to	 narrow	 	 the	 significance	 of	 a	 concept	 and	 so	 focus	 a	 field	 of	
enquiry,		Wollheim	begins	from	the	narrowed	and	focused	concept	and	field	and	admits	
to	their	contingent	extension.		
	
	
I. Darwin	on	Beauty	and	Display		
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Kant	 is	 not	 however	 so	 easily	 dismissed.	 	 His	 question,	 why	 does	 nature	 produce	
beautiful-to-us	 superficial	 characteristics	 along	 with	 useful-to-the-organism	
characteristics	was	a	problem	for	anyone	who	did	not	believe	 in	a	great	Designer,	and	
especialy	 for	 anyone	 who	 believed	 that	 Nature	 should	 ruthlessly	 eliminate	 the	 frail,	
fancy,	and	delicate	in	favour	of	the	mighty	and	robust.		
		
Darwin	had	at	least	a	passing	acquaintance	with	18th	theories	of	the	moral	sense	and	the	
aesthetic	 sense	 and	 he	 was	 puzzled,	 as	 Kant	 had	 been,	 by	 the	 seemingly	 gratuitous	
beauty	 of	 natural	 forms.	 Natural	 selection	 favours	 efficient	 metabolisms,	 resilient	
internal	 organs,	 and	 strength,	 cunning	 and	 speed,	 and	 nowadays	we	would	 for	 some	
species	 at	 last,	 impulse	 inhibition,	 devoted	 childcare,	 learning	 from	 errors	 and	
avoidance	of	futility,	but	also	curiosity	and	tenacity	and	all	sorts	of	other	survival-related	
bodily	and	mental	traits.		
	
Animals	needed	weapons	and	protective	casings	but	what,	Darwin	wondered,	explained	
the	beautiful	convolutions	of	the	shells	of	molluscs,	the	branching	and	coiling	of	antlers?		
What	explained	the	acrobatic	dances	of	birds,	their	songs,	and	their	brilliant	feathering.	
These	 formations	and	performances	not	only	raised	the	old	problems	of	 intentionality	
but	seemed	to	use	up	a	lot	of	energy,	to	limit	mobility,	and	make	animals	conspicuous	to		
predators.		
	
The	beauty	of	the	bioworld	to	our	eyes,	he	concluded,	could	not	be	accounted	for	on	the	
assumption	 than	 living	 beings	 have	 evolved	 only	 under	 the	 selection	 pressures	 of	
avoiding	predation,	defending	against	or	recovering	from	disease	or	illness,	finding	food	
and	protecting	and	nourishing	offspring.			
	
The	solution	was	to	recognize	that	mere	survival	wasn’t	enough;	the	animal	that	could	
not	 acquire	 a	 mate	 would	 not	 pass	 on	 its	 traits	 to	 the	 next	 generation	 and	 being	
attractive	 to	 the	 other	 sex	might	 compensate	 for	 weakness	 on	 the	 other	 parameters.	
Beauty	 in	 looks,	 sounds	 and	 behaviour	 was	 an	 object	 of	 selection	 by	 other	 sentient	
organisms.	
	
Darwin	 believed	 that	 consciousness	 was	 found	 far	 down	 the	 phylogenetic	 scale,	
extending	to	planaria		[1987	604]	and	he	claimed	to	find	precursors	of	the	moral	sense	
in	group	living	animals;	there	was	every	reason	to	propose	an	aesthetic	sense	in	animals	
as	well.	 	 Noting	 that	male	 birds	 tended	 to	 be	more	 noisy,	 demonstrative	 and	 brightly	
coloured,	he	proposed	that	the	females	had	shaped	their	appearance	by	responding	to	
configurations	they	happened	to	like.			
	
Males,	he	thought,	competed	not	only	in	combat	for	mating	opportunities	with	females,	
but	also	competed	in	looks.		Females	had	an	‘acute	powers	of	observation	and,	and	they	
seem	to	have	some	taste	for	the	beautiful	both	in	colour	and	sound…[they	occasionally	
exhibit…from	 unknown	 cause,	 the	 strongest	 antipathies	 and	 preferences	 [2004:	 473)	
Their	fitness	reduction	where	survival	as	concerned	was	compensated	for	by	increased	
mating	success.	Thus	natural	selection	and	sexual	selection	were	in	competition	[2004					
].			
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Darwin’s	was	mainly	therefore	a	theory	of	female	choice	in	mating,	which	has	since	been	
sustained	across	a	variety	of	species	 including	 ‘elephant	seals,	mice,	 fish,	rats,	gorillas,	
monkeys	and	birds.’	 	Women	 in	our	 species	 are	normally	 successful	 in	 controlling	 the	
pacing	 and	 outcomes	 of	 courtship	 offered	 by	 males	 [Moore	 1998].	 Female	 control	 is	
usually	 said	 to	 follow	 from	 the	 greater	 parental	 investment	 and	 so	 cost	 of	 ‘mistakes’	
born	by	females	and	the	greater	variance	in	many	male	traits	leaving	more	for	selection	
to	work	on.			
	
What	females	choose,	is	not,	it	should	be	noted	‘the	best	male’	but	the	one	they	like	the	
best,	and	Darwin	noted	that	they	could	be	highly	competitive	in	going	after	that	one.			At	
the	same	time,	different	individuals,	even	in	the	same	species,	have	different	strategies	
for	 mate	 selection,	 ranging	 from	 accepting	 the	 first	 animal	 of	 the	 opposite	 sex	
encountered,	to	sampling	and	rejecting	a	large	array	before	settling	on	one,	sometimes	
for	 no	 apparent	 reason.	 For	 both	 males	 and	 females	 there	 will	 be	 inhibitions	 and	
defenses	against	mating	as	well	as	affordances	and	incentives.	 	Pursuit	and	choosiness	
can	be	a	waste	of	time	or	dangerous	and	costly	[Jennions	and	Petrie	1997].			
	
Darwin	also	thought	that	the	male	preference	for	feminine	beauty	had	shaped	the	forms	
of	 the	 various	 ‘races’	 with	 different	 facial	 features.	 	 There	 was	 no	 single	 standard	 of	
beauty,	 though	presumably	 there	were	 some	 commonalities.	How	else	 to	 explain	why	
European	and	African	facial	features	had	diversified	though	not	in	ways	predictable	by	
climate	and	diet.			
	
So	Darwin	fused	his	belief	in	the	proto-aesthetic	sense	and	aesthetic	selection	with	the	
problems	of	 ornament	 and	 the	 formation	 of	 ‘races’	 and	posed	 sexual	 selection	 on	 the	
basis	of	beauty	along	with	other	characteristics.	Convinced	as	he	was	of	the	continuity	of	
humans	 and	 other	 animals,	 he	 had	 a	 priori	 reasons	 for	 believing	 that	 aesthetic	 liking	
was	an	independent	motive	for	certain	animal	behavior.		
	
Since	Darwin’s	time,	sexual	selection	has	been	proposed	as	the	driving	force	behind	the	
colouration	and	diversity	of	the	appearances	of	birds,	reptiles,	fish,	insects,	spiders,	and	
molluscs.	Animals	do	seem	to	be	 judging	 their	prospective	mates	on	 the	basis	of	 their	
appearances	and	they	often	seem	to	 like	exaggeration,	symmetry,	and	novelty.	 	Female	
mannikins	 [birds]	 in	 which	 both	 sexes	 are	 drab	 preferred	 to	 mate	 in	 experimental	
situations	with	males	 adorned	with	 red	 feather;	 though	males	 preferred	 unadnorned	
females.	 	 Snails	 appear	 to	 evaluate	 other	 snails	 before	mating	 by	 crawling	 over	 their	
shells	 and	 this	has	been	proposed	as	 the	means	by	which	 the	 remarkable	variety	and	
elaboration	of	forms	in	these	molluscs	has	arisen[Schilthuizen,	2003],	hard	to	explain	by	
selection	for	viability	or	fecundity,	unless	these	variations	really	do	succeed	in	confusing	
predators.	Female	tarantulas	reject	males	who	have	lost	one	of	their	leg	tufts.			
	
Sometimes,	 however,	 they	 like	 averageness:	 a	 very	 deviant	 male	 might	 not	 be	 of	 the	
same	 species	 resulting	 in	 infertile	 offspring	 and	 wasted	 investment.iii	 And	 when	 a	
popular	 trait	 becomes	 fixed,	 there	 is	 little	 for	 female	 choice	 to	 work	 on.	 	 Enormous	
controversy	has	arisen	over	 the	supposedly	exemplar	case	of	 the	peacock’s	 tail.	 	After	
careful	observation	over	8	years,	a	group	of	 Japanese	researchers	 found	 little	variance	
among	peacock	tails;	and	surmised	that	although	male	tail	display	was	a	part	of	mating	
behavior,	female	peahens	were	making	their	choices	on	some	other	basis.iv	
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Darwin’s	view	that	female	birds	possessed	‘some	taste	for	the	beautiful’	that	had	been	a	
driving	 force	 in	 evolution	 was	 contested	 by	 Wallace,	 the	 co-discoverer	 of	 natural	
selection.	 	 	 Wallace	 approved	 of	 Darwin’s	 scientific	 approach	 to	 natural	 beauty.	 ‘The	
bright	and	often	gorgeous	coloration	of	insect,	bird,	or	flower,	was	either	looked	upon	as	
having	 been	 created	 for	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 mankind,’	 	 he	 commented,	 ‘or	 as	 due	 to	
unknown	and	perhaps	undiscoverable	laws	of	nature.	…	Darwin	…showed,	clearly,	that	
some	of	 the	colours	of	animals	are	useful,	 some	hurtful	 to	 them;	and	he	believed	 that	
many	of	the	most	brilliant	colours	were	developed	by	sexual	choice	[Wallace		1889:	187]		
	
Wallace	 described	 the	 importance	 of	 colour	 in	 camouflage,	 mimicry,	 luring	 prey,	 and	
permitting	the	recognition	of	conspecifics.	He	agreed	that	‘There	seems	to	be	a	constant	
tendency	in	the	male	of	most	animals—	but	especially	of	birds	and	insects—	to	develop	
more	and	more	intensity	of	colour,	often	culminating	in	brilliant	metallic	blues	or	greens	
or	the	most	splendid	iridescent	hues..’	[ibid.	273].		
	
But	 for	all	his	own	aesthetic	sensitivity,	and	dismissal	of	 teleology,	Wallace	held	to	the	
view	 that	 the	 shapes	 and	 colours	we	 admire	 in	 birds	 and	 other	 animals	 was	 just	 an	
incidental	 effect	of	physical	 and	 chemical	processes	 that	produced	 colour	and	pattern	
everywhere	in	the	mineral,	vegetable	and	animal	kingdoms.		He	rejected	the	notion	that	
female	choice	of	aesthetic	qualities	could	really	influence	the	size	of	a	lineage	when	the	
other	forces	of	natural	selection	in	insects	and	birds	were	as	rigorous	as	they	were.		
	
Colour,	 he	 argued,	 is	 selected	 against	 in	 females,	 not	 for	 in	males:	 the	 female	 is	more	
vulnerable.	 	 ‘Natural	 selection	 is	 constantly	 at	 work,	 preventing	 the	 female	 from	
acquiring	 these	 same	 tints,	 or	 modifying	 her	 colours	 in	 various	 directions	 to	 secure	
protection	by	 assimilating	her	 to	her	 surroundings,	 or	 by	producing	mimicry	of	 some	
protected	form’	[ibid.]		In	species,	he	noted,	that	are	protected	by	their	nasty	tastes	this	
drabness	is	not	selected	for.	In	some	birds,	including	kingfishers,	the	woodpeckers,	the	
toucans,	the	parrots,	the	turacos,	the	females	are	as	brilliantly	coloured	and	conspicuous	
as	the	males,	which	Wallace	explains	as	their	building	nests	that	completely	conceal	the	
incubating	bird		
	
Wallace	 recognized	 that	 male	 birds	 display	 their	 plumage	 to	 best	 advantage	 and	
perform	stunts	[ibid.	288]	and,	he	agreed,	‘	it	may	also	be	admitted,	as	highly	probable,	
that	 the	 female	 is	pleased	or	excited	by	the	display’	 [ibid.	285]	 	 	But,	he	said,	 ‘it	by	no	
means	follows	that	slight	differences	in	the	shape,	pattern,	or	colours	of	the	ornamental	
plumes	are	what	lead	a	female	to	give	the	preference	to	one	male	over	another;	still	less	
that	 all	 the	 females	 of	 a	 species,	 or	 the	 great	 majority	 of	 them,	 over	 a	 wide	 area	 of	
country,	 and	 for	many	 successive	generations,	prefer	 exactly	 the	 same	modification	of	
the	colour	or	ornament’	[ibid.,	285]			
	
He	offered	the	analogy	of	a	suitor	who,’	when	courting,	brushes	or	curls	his	hair,	and	has	
his	moustache,	beard,	or	whiskers	 in	perfect	order,’	This	pleases	his	girlfriend,	but	she	
does	not	chose	him	on	that	basis	[ibid.	286].			
	
Further,	he	said,	‘we	cannot	conclude	from	this	that	the	whole	series	of	male	costumes,	
from	 the	brilliantly	 coloured,	puffed,	 and	 slashed	doublet	 and	hose	of	 the	Elizabethan	
period,	 through	 the	gorgeous	coats,	 long	waistcoats,	and	pigtails	of	 the	early	Georgian	
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era,	down	 to	 the	 funereal	dress-suit	of	 the	present	day,	 are	 the	direct	 result	of	 female	
preference’	[ibid.]		
	
Wallace’s	arguments,	beside	his	firm	conviction	that	natural	selection	was	too	harsh	and	
rigorous	a	process	to	allow	the	frivolity	of	aesthetic	preference]	to	have	any	significant	
role	 in	 influencing	 the	 direction	 of	 evolution	 [ibid.	 295]	 were	 reasonable.	 	 They	
represented	a	selection	of	Darwin’s	own	observations	and	included	the	following:	
	
1) Displays	 often	 occur	 after	 the	 pair	 has	 bonded,	 so	 they	 cannot	 function	 as	
selection	criteria.	
2) Females	 (in	 the	 henyard	 anyway)	 preferred	 "the	 most	 vigorous,	 defiant,	 and	
mettlesome	male,"	not	the	prettiest	[ibid.	286].		
3) The	 ‘surplus	 of	 strength,	 vitality,	 and	 growth-power’	 in	 males	 was	 sufficient	
explanation	 of	 their	 ornaments,	 and	 of	 the	 seeming	 correlation	 between	
ornament	and	preferences	[ibid.	293].		
4) The	 female’s	perceptual	 apparatus	 is	not	 sharp	enough	 to	 ‘cause	her	 to	 choose	
her	mate	 on	 account	 of	minute	differences	 in	 their	 forms,	 colours,	 or	 patterns’	
[ibid.	294].		
5) Acting	on	aesthetic	preferences	implies	making	a	voluntary	choice	beyond	being	
stimulated	and	excited	and	 this	 is	beyond	 the	capacity	of	 the	animal	mind.	 ‘We	
have,	thus,	no	reason	for	imputing	to	her	any	of	those	aesthetic	emotions	which	
are	excited	in	us,	by	the	beauty	of	form,	colour,	and	pattern	of	these	plumes	[ibid.	
294]	v		
6) Partner	choice	often	appears	to	be	arbitrary	or	to	select	seemingly	unattractive	
individuals.	 	 Wallace	 had	 been	 assured	 that	 moths	 choose	 their	 mates	 pretty	
much	 at	 random	 and	 he	 cited	 Darwin’s	 anecdote	 of	 some	 peahens	who	 had	 a	
strong	liking	for	an	‘old	pied	peacock’	[ibid.	285].			
	
Unlike	some	of	his	contemporaries,	Wallace	did	not	deny	that	females	exercised	choice	
and	certainly	not	because	of	any	supposed	Victorian	notion	of	natural	female	passivity.		
As	an	opponent	of	eugenics,	he	advocated	more	female	empowerment,	more	free	choice	
for	women	unconstrained	by	economic	and	 social	needs.	 	But	 those	 choices	would	be	
directed	 to	 worthy	 qualities	 not	 prettiness.	 	 Unlike	 Darwin,	 who	 was	 probably	 a	
materialist,	Wallace	believed	that	there	had	been	a	second	act	of	creation…,	“a	giving	to	
man,	when	he	had	emerged	from	his	ape-like	ancestry,	of	a	spirit	or	a	soul.	Nothing	in	
evolution	can	account	 for	 the	soul	of	man.	The	difference	between	man	and	 the	other	
animals	is	unbridgeable.”vi	
	
The	current	mainstream	view	with	regard	to	attractiveness	is	that	of	Wallace	and	it	goes	
under	 the	headings	of	honest	signalling	and	handicap	 theory	 [Zahavi	 	1975;	Hamilton	
and	Zuk	1982].	The	 idea	 is	 that	 the	healthiest,	most	 robust	organisms,	unmenaced	by	
too	many	 life-draining	parasites	 can	produce	elaborate	and	highly	 symmetrical,	hence	
beautiful,	structures	and	dances.	An	animal	that	does	so	advertises	its	underlying	vigor	
and	 its	ability	 to	have	survived	 the	encumbrances	of	 fancy	 tails	or	heavy	antlers.	 	The	
male	on	the	honest	signaling/handicap	view	is	indicating	that	he	is	a	healthy	bird	with	
surplus	 resources	 to	 spend	 time	 collecting	 material	 for	 the	 bower	 and	 arranging	 it,		
rather	than	needing	for	example	to	eat	or	escape	predators.	 	The	females	are	selecting	
‘good	[nonaesthetic]	genes.’	
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By	 contrast,	 Darwin’s	 view	 was	 that	 a	 trait	 could	 be	 preserved	 or	 enhanced	 simply	
because	 prospective	 mates	 had	 a	 taste	 for	 it.	 The	 male	 trait	 did	 not	 need	 to	 signal	
anything	except	‘Look	at	me!...I	am	available’	The	female	preference	for	it	did	not	need	to	
indicate	‘I	see	you	have	a	good	metabolism	and	have	escaped	predators	so	far’	but	only	
‘Nice!...OK.’		 	The	benefit	to	the	female	of	choosing	the	beautiful	male	was:		a)	her	mate	
search	was	 terminated	and	she	could	stop	dilly-dallying	and	get	on	with	reproduction	
and	b)	her	male	offspring	might	inherit	the	trait	and	be	attractive	to	other	females.		The	
search	for	food	and	a	mate	requires	‘stop’	signals,	lest	we	go	on	interminably	looking	for	
something	 better.	 	 Ronald	 Fisher	 confirmed	Darwin’s	 supposition	 that	 a	 trait	with	 no	
positive	 correlation	 to	 male	 viability	 and	 indicating	 no	 benefit	 to	 the	 female	 or	 her	
offspring	 except	 their	 father’s	 attractive	 looks	 could	 become	 exaggerated	 and	
widespread	(1930,	137).				
	
	
V.	
	
The	modern	advocate	of	he	minority,	Darwinian	view	is	the	ornithologist	Richard	Prum,.		
Prum	believes	not	only	that	sexual	selection	based	on	pure	preference	accounts	for	the	
beauty	and	diversity	of	birds,	insects,	snakes,	and	reptiles.	Their	nonhuman	‘artworlds’	
are	composed	of	participants	in	the	process	of	‘aesthetic	expression,	evaluation,	
judgement	and	change.’		(2012:	813)	‘Every	time	you	find	co-evolution	between	
advertisement	or	expression	and	evaluation,	then	I	propose	that	you	have	art.	And	that	
means	that	flowers	are	art,	most	of	them;	and	that	birdsong	is	art;	and	lots	of	aspects	of	
bird	plumage	are	art.	And	crickets	chirping.”			
	
Darwin’s	 view,	 Prum	 argues,	 should	 be	 considered	 the	 ‘null	 hypothesis’.	 	 We	 cannot	
prove	that	females	who	seem	to	be	making	pure	aesthetic	choices	are	not	responding	to	
indicators	 of	 nonaesthetic	 ‘good	 genes.’	 	 But	 why	 assume	 this	 as	 a	 methodological	
principle?	 	 	We	have	ample	evidence,	he	observes,	 that	animals’	sensory	organs	prefer	
and	are	attracted	to	as	well	as	being	repulsed	by	and	disliking	the	visual	appearances,	
tastes,	and	smells	and	sounds	of	other	animals	of	 their	own	and	other	species,	plants,	
and	fungi.	 	There	are	forms	whose	origin	and	continuing	existence	depends	on	the	fact	
that	they	can	provoke	a	rewarding	visual,	tactile,	odorific,	or	other	sensory	response	in	
another	 organism,	 encouraging	 interaction	 with	 it,	 on	 account	 of	 the	 effects	 on	 its	
nervous	 system	 have	 that	 significance.	 vii	 They	 belong	 to	 a	 ‘marketplace	 of	 animal	
sensory	 experiences	 and	 choices’	 in	 which	 animals	 can	 ‘evaluate,	 differentiate,	 and	
remember.’	(2012:816)		
	
Light	and	matter,	as	Wallace	insisted,	without	the	guidance	of	any	intelligent	agent	but	
under	the	forces	of	physics	and	chemistry	and	poorly	understood	mechanisms	can	
produce	striking	colour	effects	and	symmetrical	and	interesting	shapes.		Many	beautiful	
forms	have	no	evolutionary	significance	including	snowflakes,	sunsets,	waterfalls,	the	
shapes	of	crystals,	diatoms,	and	viruses.		But	beautiful	forms	arising	in	plants	and	
animals	that	need	to	be	noticed	and	chosen	by	other	organisms	belong	to	a	form	a	
subset	of	those	of	beautiful	nature.	Dragonflies	evolved	by	degrees	to	look	the	way	they	
do	because	of	the	effect	their	appearance	had	on	members	of	their	own	or	other	species	
whereas	geode	crystals,	snowflakes,	and	fern	fronds	did	not.			
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We	 can	 think	 of	 plants	 as	 well	 as	 nonhuman	 animals	 as	 ‘attempting’	 to	 exploit	 the	
sensory	systems	and	behavioural	responses	of	other	animals,	and	as	‘experimenting’	by	
unconsciously,	 unintentionally	 evolving	 appearances	 such	 as	 the	 various	 shapes	 and	
colours	 of	 flowers	 which	 are	 trying	 to	 lure	 pollinating	 insects	 or	 stripes	 or	 shadings	
which	 are	 trying	 to	 hide	 an	 animal	 from	 parasites	 or	 prey	 or	 predators	 appeal	 or	 he	
warning	coloration	of	certain	snakes	or	toadstools	or	the	skunk.			
	
The	sensory,	emotional,	and	behavioural	systems	of	animals	are	experimenting	as	well.		
They	try	out	sensory	presentations	of	a	world	to	discover	which	works	best,	which	
tastes	and	preferences	and	responses	to	the	presented	world	are	keeping	it	–that	is	to	
say	its	lineage	alive.		As	Prum	points	out,	flowers	do	not	converge	on	a	single	‘optimal’	
form	and	odour	that	‘elicits	the	apian	foraging	response	with	the	greatest	efficiency.’	By	
contrast,	roots	do	not	partake	of	biotic	display.		They	are	simply	optimised	for	collection	
and	transport	of	water	in	ambient	soils	and	do	not	show	the	same	variation	(2012:	815-
6).		
	
So	the	biotic	world	is	composed	of	signallers	who	try	out	new	displays,	some	of	which	
flop,	and	also	passing	successful	display	habits	and	morphology	along	to	their	
descendants.	It	also	composed	of	evaluators,	who	try	out	new	evaluations	and	reactions,	
but	also	pass	down	those	that	worked	for	them	to	their	successors.			
There	is	co-ordination:	the	bee	gets	nectar,	the	flower	gets	pollinated,	the	dragonfly	gets	
a	mate,	the	snake	is	unmolested	and	the	rat	doesn’t	succumb	to	venom.		But	also	
victimization	by	the	exploitation	of	sensory	systems:	the	fly	gets	eaten	by	the	flytrap	and	
the	gazelle	doesn’t	see	the	tiger	in	the	tall	grass.	
	
If	co-ordination	has	been	achieved,	as	it	must	have	been	for	a	species	to	be	there	at	all,	
why	do	tastes	and	appearancea	change?	Innovation	in	appearance	traits	we	can	suppose	
is	accidental	and	usually	harmful	like	most	mutations.		But	evolving	a	new	display	trait	
might	 provoke	 a	 favourable	 reaction	 by	 happening	 to	 push	 another	 animal’s	 buttons.	
Evolving	 a	 new	 taste	 can	 get	 you	 a	 mate	 that	 all	 your	 competitors	 have	 fortunately	
overlooked	or	just	get	you	to	settle	down	and	make	some	choice	or	other.	viii		
	
Fine	art	in	the	human	world,	according	to	Prum,	involves	the	same	pattern	of	invent	
tion,	expression,	evaluation,	judgement,	and	change.		And	the	aesthetic	goodness	of	
good	art	objects	is	a	feature	of		co-ordinated	inventions	and	preferences	that	are	under	
human	control	and	reflect	cultural	forces	such	as	education.		
What	then	 is	beauty?		It	is	the	imputed	quality	of	an	object	that	makes	you	want	to,	as	
Plato	 implies	 in	 the	Symposium,	 to	gaze	on	 it:	 to	 listen	to	 it,	watch	 it,	 sniff	 it,	 run	your	
hands	 over	 it,	 to	 the	 natural	 point	 of	 satiation;	 the	 transmitters	 are	 depleted,	we	 are	
bored	or	conscious	of	duty	awaiting.	 	 In	 the	case	of	a	pretty	pebble	 this	can	of	course	
happen	pretty	fast.		We	want	to	be	’near’	the	sources	of	these	experiences,	sometimes	to	
be	 their	producers	or	 to	 copy	 them,	 and	where	possible	 to	 secure	 the	objects	 to	have	
access	to	this	pleasurable	stimulation,	anticipating	that	they	will	be	a	joy	forever.		Beauty	
I	suggested	earlier	is	what	makes	us	halt:		Beauty	floors	you:	you	stand	there	rooted	to	
the	spot.		‘I	never	wanted	it	to	end’	people	say.	‘I	couldn’t	take	my	eyes	off	him’	‘I	could	
have	gone	on	looking	at	that	picture	forever.’		
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But	 why	 do	 we	 like	 the	 peacock’s	 tail	 or	 the	 rose	 or	 the	 mollusc’s	 shell	 when	 its	
advertisement	is	not	directed	at	us?	Why	the	near	universal	human	liking,	Kant’s	point	
of	 departure,	 for	 feathers,	 shells,	 flowers,	 sunsets,	 gemstones,	 fireworks	 etc.	 ?	 	 Our	
nervous	systems	must	have	enough	in	common	with	those	of	birds,	bees,	and	perhaps	
even	snails	that	certain	formations,	such	as	symmetrical	or	fractal	structures,	are	both	
easy	 for	 nature	 to	 make	 and	 easy	 for	 animals,	 whose	 nervous	 systems	 are	 equally	
constructed	 by	 nature,	 to	 like.	 Dutton	 denies	 that	 these	 objects	work	 on	 our	 nervous	
systems	as	a	recreational	drug	painting	is	not	‘a	pill	that	alters	brain	chemistry	and	gives	
us	‘beautiful	landscape	feelings.’	ix		But	why	not?		Hallucinogenic	drugs	and	other	altered	
states	of	consciousness	as	Aldous	Huxley	argued	give	us	powerful	experiences	of	beauty	
simply	by	releasing	and	inhibiting	neurotransmitters	(Wilson	2015).						
		
It	may	be	objected,	in	a	Hegelian	spirit,	that	art	involves	ideas	and	links	us	to	history	and	
the	 human	 life	 cycle	 and	 practices	 and	 emotions	 in	 such	 a	 sophisticated	 and	 even	
transformative	way	that	all	conceptual	connection	with	natural	beauty	gives	way	to	thi	
special	 kind	 of	 ‘aesthetic	 significance.’	 	 Connoisseurship	 in	 the	 human	 artworld	 can	
enthusiastically	attach	to	things	like	the	Venus	of	Willendorf	or	the	paintings	of	Francis	
Bacon	 whose	 aesthetic	 significance	 is	 remote	 from	 that	 of	 birds	 and	 flowers	 	 I	 will	
return	 to	 this	question	after	evaluating	 the	other	Darwinian	 theory,	 that	of	Miller	and	
Dutton.			
	
	
	
I. Miller	and	Dutton	
	
Darwin	supposed	that	apes	might	be	impressed	by  as he put it Ôthe beauty of  the coloured 
skin and fur of  their partners in marriage.Õ  (Darwin 2004: 150) The facial features of  some apes 
and monkeys are believed to have been shaped by female choice. 	However,	where	our	closest	
primate	relatives	are	concerned,	ornamentation	does	not	seem	to	have	been	pushed	to	
extremes.	 Individuals	 are	 evaluated	 and	 selected	 as	 mates	 for	 their	 status,	 their	 age	
familiarity,	and	 their	novelty,	but	 there	 is	no	evidence	 that	 their	beauty	 is	noticed	and	
responded	to.	 	Where	we	might	take	human	morality	to	be	an	embellished,	developed,	
corrected	 form	 of	 primate	 protomoral	 behaviour,	 	 the	 proposal	 here	 is	 not	 to	 take	
human	 aesthetic	 behaviour	 as	 an	 embellished,	 developed,	 corrected	 from	 of	 primate	
protoaesthetic	 behaviour.	 Dutton,	 for	 his	 part,	 regarded	 the	 ‘art	 instinct’	 as	 uniquely	
human.	Art,	he	insisted	is	a	human	production,	‘Animals	construct	stunning	objects	and	
put	on	spectacular	performances.’		[2009:	99]	Nevertheless,	they	‘do	not	create	art.’			Art	
he	maintains	 requires	 intention	 and	 control	 over	 a	 formative	 process	 and	 an	 ongoing	
interest	in	the	products.		When	animals	are	interested	in	the	products	as	in	plumage,	it	
was	not	created	 intentionally	and	when	it	 is	created	 intentionally,	 like	the	paintings	of	
chimpanzees	and	elephants,	he	observes,	they	are	not	interested	in	the	products.		
	
Furless	 humans,	 however,	 with	 their	 compared	 to	 other	 mammals	 broad	 chests	 and	
frontal	postures,	do	create	displays	with	face-painting,	nail	polish,	tattoos,	 jewelry,	and	
clothing	and	it	is	difficult	not	to	see	this	as	bird	like	behavior	intended	to	attract	as	well	
as	to	serve	perhaps	other	functions.	 	Darwin	wrote	to	Wallace	a	propos	of	his	book	on	
the	Malay	Archipelago	in		March,1869		
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	‘In	Vol.	 II.,	 p.	 255,	 you	 speak	of	male	 savages	 ornamenting	 themselves	more	 than	 the	
women,	of	which	I	have	heard	before;	now,	have	you	any	notion	whether	they	do	this	to	
please	 themselves,	 or	 to	 excite	 the	 admiration	 of	 their	 fellow-men,	 or	 to	 please	 the	
women,	or,	as	is	perhaps	probable,	from	all	three	motives?	[Marchant	ed.	1916	x		
	
Unfortunately	this	letter	was	not	answered	or	the	reply	has	been	lost.	Geoffrey	Miller’s	
book	 The	 Mating	 Mind	 proposed	 an	 answer:	 Artistic	 production,	 he	 maintained,	 is	 a	
form	 of	 male	 behavior	 that	 was	 selected	 for	 by	 females	 in	 the	 Environment	 of	 Early	
Adaptation.		
	
This	 is	 not	 an	 absurd	 suggestion.	 In	 1985,	 Richard	 Dawkins	 introduced	 the	 term	
‘extended	phenotype’	 to	 include	animal	behaviours	and	productions	 that	are	heritable	
with	 variation	 and	 so	 involve	 a	 genetic	 component	 (which	 may	 be	 prompted	 by	
observation	and	learning).	This	allows	us	to	consider	as	part	of	our	‘animal’	not	just	its	
body,	 but	 the	 structures	 it	 builds	 such	 as	 nests,	 burrows,	 and	 dams,	 its	 behavioural	
dispositions	and	habits,	 its	vocalisations.	The	nest	of	 the	bowerbird	on	 this	view	 is	as	
much	 a	 part	 of	 the	 animal	 as	 the	 shell	 of	 the	 snail,	 emanating	 from	 its	mantle.	 	 The	
concept	of	the	extended	phenotype	opens	the	door	to	treating	human	artifacts,	not	only	
species	specific	tools	and	weapons	which	can	be	seen	as	versions	of	claw,	horns,	teeth,	
and	beaks,	as	parts	of	the	humans	who	use	them,	but	other	species-specific	objects	that	
it	uses	for	survival	or	to	attract	mates,	or	to	raise	its	young.			
	
But	how	did	this	alleged	selection	process	work	and	what	is	the	evidence	cited	for	it?			
	
Miller	agrees	with	the	majority	of	students	of	human	evolution	that	the	human	brain	–
roughly	 3	 x	 the	 size	 of	 the	 chimpanzee	 brain--could	 not	 have	 evolved	 for	 foraging,	
hunting,	predator	avoidance,	and	infant	care;	for	other	primates	accomplish	these	tasks	
with	their	smaller	ones.		Rather,	he	proposed,	the	brain	evolved	to	display	an	ornament--	
the	 mind.	 The	 human	 mind’s	 most	 impressive	 abilities—linguistic	 ability,	 wit,	
insightfulness,	 and	 artistic	 competence,	 he	 argued,	 are	 “courtship	 tools,	 evolved	 to	
attract	and	entertain	sexual	partners”	(	2000:	4).	xi	
	
Mentality,	 for	Miller,	evolved	as	a	male	display-feature,	analogous	to	the	peacock’s	 tail,	
with	 witty,	 mathematical	 and	 artistic	 men	 preferred	 as	 mates.	 Because	 of	 genetic	
correlation	between	the	sexes	women’s	brains	got	to	be	almost	as	big	and	their	general	
intelligence	 just	 as	 great	 and	 their	 aesthetic	 aptitude.	 	 Yet	 men	 employ	 their	 artistic	
powers	to	a	greater	extent	in	competition.		
	
‘Sexual	selection	theory,’	says	Miller,		
	would	 predict	 sexual	 dimorphism	 in	 the	 public	 behavioral	 manifestations	 of	
intelligence,	because	the	reproductive	benefits	of	such	displays	would	always	be	
higher	 for	 males	 than	 for	 females	 given	 some	 degree	 of	 polygyny	 [i.e.	 male	
promiscuity].	 .	 .	 Demographic	 data	 on	 the	 production	 of	 costly,	 difficult,	 public	
displays	of	intelligence	such	as	painting	pictures,	writing	novels,	producing	jazz	
albums,	 and	 publishing	 philosophical	 speculations	 (!)	 reveals	 a	 very	 strong	
dimorphism,	with	males	producing	about	ten	times	more	displays	than	females,	
and	male	display	rates	peaking	in	early	sexual	maturity	(ibid.	82-3)	.		
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For	 Miller,	 this	 is	 true	 ‘Fisherian’	 selection:	 a	 matter	 of	 pure	 liking	 that	 rapidly	
exaggerates	 the	 trait-collection	 of	 ‘creative	 intelligence’	 including	 artistic	 competence	
and	performance.		
	
Denis	 Dutton	 follows	 this	 approach,	 in	 the	 Art	 Instinct	 but	 he	 adds	 some	 Wallacean	
elements	to	Miller’s	more	authentically	Darwinian	approach.		Dutton	takes	beauty	to	be	
an	 indicator	 of	 health	 and	 ‘high	 quality	 genes’	 (	 2009:	 137,	 156)	 and	 he	 believes	 the	
same	 of	 language	 use:	 that	 it	 is	 an	 honest	 signal	 of	 intelligence	 and	 capability	
contributing	to	viability.	(ibid:	152).	He	assumes	that	sexual	selection	‘typically	involves	
aggressive	 fighting	among	males	 for	 females	 in	a	winner	take	all	situation’	(ibid:	139).		
He	cites	many	examples	of	human	males	displaying	ornaments	 to	 females	or	bringing	
them	 pretty	 gifts.	 	 And	 he	 introduces	 handicap	 theory	 to	 argue	 that	 artistic	 objects	
achieve	 their	 effects	 in	 virtue	 of	 being	 ‘the	most	 opulent,	 extravagant,	 glittering,	 and	
profligate	 creations	 of	 the	 human	mind,’	 They	 squander	 brain	 power,	 physical	 effort,	
time	and	resources.’	(ibid:	136)			
	
In	evaluating	this	view	we	should	take	the	stance	that	it	could	be	right.	Despite	all	the	
unclarity	surround	both	female	choice	and	the	mechanisms	of	evolution,	it	is	generally	
agreed	 that	 the	 colours	 and	 forms	of	plants	 and	animals	 are	 shaped	by	biotic	display,	
and	 it	 is	 generally	 agreed	 that	 a	 soul	 did	 not	 descend	 of	 human	 beings	 from	 a	
supernatural	 source	 and	 so	 that	 perceptions,	 dispositions,	 and	 behavior	 have	 been	
shaped	by	the	same	evolutionary	forces	that	shape	physiology	and	anatomy.			
	
The	appeal	of	the	Miller-Dutton	theory	is	that	it	regards	not	only	the	human	body	as	a	
target	of	preference	and	selection,	but	also	the	mind.	It	links	human	self-decoration	and	
hairdressing	 to	animal	plumage	and	grooming,	 and	 the	 impulse	 to	build	and	adorn	 to	
such	exercises	as	nest	and	bower	building.	Further,	 it	explains	why	despite	being	past	
prime	reproductive	age,	alcoholic,	unhealthy,	and	mean,	high-achieving	novelists,	poets,	
and	musicians	subject	to	addictions,	malnutrition,	vehicular	accidents,	and	so	on.	
	can	attract	young,	beautiful	intelligent	women:	Either	the	handicap	principle	is	kicking	
in	 indicating	 those	 ‘good	 genes,’	 or	 maybe	 women’s	 aesthetic	 preference	 trumps	 all	
indicators	of	poor	paternal	interest	and	competence.		
	
However,	 in	 trying	 to	 estimate	 the	 likelihood	 of	 this	 account,	 we	 need	 not	 just	 to	
consider	what	phenomena	it	could	explain,	but	what	phenomena	it	explains	better	than	
competitor	theories	and	what	would	have	to	be	the	case	for	the	process	to	work.			
	
By	way	of	doing	so	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	two	claims:		
	
A)Artistic	 competence	 and	 a	 disposition	 to	 exercise	 it	 was	 a	 trait	 that	 was	 gradually	
strengthened	 in	 human	 by	 a	 process	 of	 selection	 in	 which	 females	 preferred	 more	
artistic	males	to	 less	–either	because	as	Dutton	claims,	they	saw	artistic	production	as	
revealing	a	surplus	of	the	qualities	they	needed	to	reproduce	or	because	they	benefited	
by	giving	birth	to	sons	with	the	attractive	trait—artistic	competence	and	performance--	
women	happened	to	like.		
	
	B)	Human	males	use	their	somehow	evolved	large,	metabolically	expensive	brains	and	
dexterous	hands	and	their	artistic	tastes	to	exercise	a	new	form	of	competence	to	try	to	
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attract	mates.		Sometimes	their	efforts	pay	off	with	reproductive	success	that	would	not	
have	been	achieved	otherwise.		
	
B)	is	obviously	true:	people	use	their	collections	of	etchings,	also	fashion,	make-up,	and	
swapped	 youtube	 videos,	 and	 express	 their	 liking	 for	museums	 and	 restaurants,	 in	 a	
manner	intended	to	impress	and	seduce	others.		Sometimes	it	works,	other	times	it	does	
not.		But	the	phenomena	could	be	explained	by	the	existence	of	a	taste	for	beauty	and	a	
competence	 in	manufacturing	 and	decorating	 that	 are	 accidental	 effects	 ‘spandrels’	 of	
good	 eyesight	 and	 fine	 eye-hand	 co-ordination	 and	 a	 large	 brain	 along	 with	 cultural	
developments	innovations	that	allowed	for	leisure	time.			
	
An	intermediate	hypothesis	would	be	C)	the	large	brain	and	other	preconditions	evolved	
through	sexual	selection	of	males	by	females	but	it	was	not	the	case	that	some	animals	
left	more	 descendants	 than	 others	 because	 their	 artistic	 competencies	 awarded	 them	
extra	mating	opportunities.			And	there	could	well	be	other	versions	of	the	hypothesis	D	
and	E	according	to	which	females	are	the	main	producers	and	males	the	consumers	or	
in	which	both	sexes	engage	in	selection.		
	
Dutton	seems	to	be	clearly	committed	to	A)	with	talk	of	an	‘art	instinct’	whereas	Miller	
could	 be	 interpreted	 in	 accord	 with	 A)	 or	 C).	 	 Since	 A)	 is	 the	 more	 provocative	
hypothesis,	I	will	concentrate	on	it.	So	what	would	have	to	be	the	case	for	A)	to	be	true?		
	
First,	 it	would	 have	 to	 be	 the	 case	 that	 artistic	 abilities	 and	 the	 propensity	 to	 display	
them	were	heritable	 from	parent	 to	child.	 In	 the	case	of	peacock	plumage,	both	males	
and	females	possess	 the	genes	 for	 fancy	tails,	but	 their	expression	 is	dampened	 in	the	
female	by	estrogen,	so	the	same	might	be	true	in	a	Miller	scenario.			
	
This	could	be	tested	and	has	been.	However,	tests	of	‘creativity’	or	‘creative	intelligence’	
involving	 things	 like	 thinking	 up	 lots	 of	 uses	 for	 a	 brick	 seem	 to	 me	 completely	
irrelevant.		We	should	be	concentrating	on	the	abilities	need	to	fashion	a	shapely	pot	or	
decorate	a	tool	or	implant	a	tattoo	or	braid	a	friend’s	hair,	or	to	carry	a	tune	or	dance	in	
a	sinuous	and	yet	elegant,	as	opposed	to	a	clumsy	fashion.	 	Perfectionism,	attention	to	
detail	 as	well	 as	 good	motor	 control	 are	 essential,	 but	 importantly	 so	 is	 taste.	 	 In	 the	
biotic	 world	 the	 producers	 and	 evaluators	 are	 different,	 but	 in	 the	 world	 of	 human	
artistry	 the	 artist	 must	 evaluate	 as	 they	 go	 along.	 Thus	 sticking	 to	 the	 A	 hypothesis,	
females	would	have	to	pass	their	ability	to	distinguish	good	art	from	bad	along	to	their	
future-artist	sons	as	well	as	their	future-evaluator	daughters.		
	
If	 the	 daughters	 have	 taste	 and	 have	 the	 same	 perfectionism,	 attention	 to	 detail	 and	
good	motor	control	as	their	brothers,	they	will	be	producing	art	as	well.		Everybody	will	
produce	 and	 evaluate	 art	 in	 the	 Environment	 of	 Early	 Adaptation.	 	 This	 scenario	 is		
empirically	plausible.	 	It	is	consistent	with	A:	maybe	the	females	are	making	their	own	
art	but	they	still	prefer	as	mates	the	artier	males	leading	to	runaway	selection.				
	
Another	condition	that	would	have	to	obtain	is	that	artier	males	with	their	genes	for	art	
are	given	or	can	attract	more	females	as	mates	than	less	arty	ones.	 	One	problem	with	
the	 hypothesis	 is	 that	 humans	 do	 not	 choose	 their	 mates	 as	 birds,	 lizards,	 fish,	 and	
spiders	do.	Rather,	arranged	‘monogamous’	marriage	with	exchange	of	women	between	
groups	 appears	 to	 date	 back	 at	 least	 50,000	 years	 [Walker	 et	 al.	 2011]	 where	 it	
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presumably	was	based	on	criteria	of	kinship,	alliance	building	and	status.	 	Perhaps	the	
arrangers	 were	 impressed	 by	 artistic	 abilities,	 or	 the	 principals,	 but	 the	 Wallacean	
impulse	to	say	that	such	frivolous	criteria	would	not	have	been	likely	to	be	employed	is	
strong	her.		
	
To	be	 sure	 somewhere	between	1-50%	of	 offspring,	 depending	on	 social	 policing	 and	
the	 internalization	 of	 norms,	 are	 the	 products	 of	 adulterous	 relationships	 and	 these	
might	 be	 supposed	 to	 occur	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 spontaneous	 likings	 unaffected	 by	 social	
concerns.	 But	 we	 can	 readily	 suppose	 that	 these	 ‘pure	 likings’	 attached	 to	 limbs	 and	
faces,	gait,	diction,	and	manners,	personality	and	character.	That	adulterous	unions	were	
made	more	likely	by	the	possession	of	artistic	talent	and	likings	for	the	other	person’s	
decorations	 and	dances,	 not	 to	mention	 the	 quality	 of	 their	manufactured	 artifacts,	 is	
possible	but	again	hardly	obvious.		
	
So,	 we	 can’t	 rule	 out	 scenario	 A)	 However,	 the	 only	 reason	 the	 hypothesis	 seems	 to	
suggest	itself	as	better	than	hypothesis	B)	or	C)	or	D)	or	E)		is	the	greater	professional	
involvement	of	men	vs.	women	since	art	began	to	command	income,	and	the	popularity	
of	 artists	 in	 our	modern	world.	 	 This	 is	 not	 high	quality	 evidence	 for	 an	 evolutionary	
process	beginning	in	the	late	Pleistocene.	Miller’s	observation	that	male	display	rates	in	
the	 fine	 arts	 are	 greater	 than	 female	 display	 rates	 and	 coincide	 with	 the	 peak	
reproductive	years	tells	us	something	about	educational	institutions	and	the	division	of	
labour,	but	hardly	supports	inferences	to	the	EEA		xii	Aesthetic	practices	get	allocated.	In	
hunter-gather,	 and	 nomadic	 societies	 in	which	 artistry	 consists	 in	 the	manufacture	 of	
garments,	 rugs	 and	wraps,	 body	 art,	 the	 decoration	 of	 pots	 and	weapons,	 there	 is	 no	
evidence	of	male	domination	across	cultures.	
	
Women	in	civilization,	in	a	condition	of	economic	dependency	in	which	status	and	titles	
are	 important	 may	 actually	 use	 aesthetic	 competence	 and	 performance		
nonprofessionally	and	far	more	broadly	than	men,	as	attractants	for	a	scarce	resource.	
Young	 Victorian	 women	 learned	 drawing,	 embroidery,	 piano,	 and	 other	
accomplishments.	 Much	 ‘traditional’	 female	 aesthetic	 activity,	 such	 as	 picking	 out	
birthday	 cards,	 or	 decorating	 the	 home,	 or	 making	 cakes	 looks	 like	 ‘mating	 mind’	
activity	 intended	to	attract	suitors	or	to	maintain	relationships,	so	Miller	might	 just	as	
well	have	run	his	argument	the	other	way.		Where	handicap	theory	is	concerned,	female	
aestheticism	in	the	choice	of	novelties	in	clothing,	accessories,	perfumes,	hairdos	and	so	
on	is	extremely	costly	and	time-consuming	as	well.		
	
IV	
	
The	evolutionary	 theories	of	Dutton	and	Miller	 focus	on	the	production	of	art,	not	 the	
liking	 for	 it.	 But	 this	 is	 backwards.	 Logically	 the	 taste	 for	 beauty	 must	 precede	 the	
appearance	of	beauty,	which	then	exploits	it.	 	And	in	the	human	case	taste—the	ability	
to	 judge	 and	 correct	 one’s	 own	 efforts—must	 arise	 simultaneously	with	manufacture	
and	 performance	 because	 artistry	 unlike	 plumage	 and	 colouration	 is	 under	 voluntary	
control.	Beauty	is	not	beauty	if	it	does	not	trigger	the	liking	and	wanting	response.		
	
The	 favoured	 explanation	 for	 the	 ‘taste	 for	 beauty’	 	 at	 present	 is	 ‘sensory	 bias’	which	
implies	that	‘the	sensory	system	of	any	species	will	be	pre-adapted	to	perceive	some	not	
yet	 evolved	 stimulus	 in	 a	 particular	way.’	 (Burley	 1985,	 p.	 31)	 ‘Aesthetic	 preferences,	
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then,	are	emergent	properties	of	 the	central	nervous	system	and	sensory	systems	that	
orginated	 incidentally,	 because	 they	 were	 inherited	 and	 not	 extinguished	 or	 because	
they	make	a	contribution	to	searching	food	or	building	nests	or	doing	other	survival	and	
reproduction	 related	 tasks,	 rather	 than	 not	 through	 active	 selection	 on	 mate	
preferences’(Burley	 and	 Szymanski,	 793).	 	 Thus	 animals	 contain	 these	 reservoirs	 of	
latent	preferences	that	become	operational	only	when	some	innovation	happens	along	
to	exploit	them.		
	
This	 explanation	 illuminates	Kant’s	notion	 that	 the	aesthetic	 attitude	 is	 ‘disinterested’	
[Kant							]	Kant	distinguished	between	the	good	form	of	a	horse	or	palace	or	woman	–
objects	he	thought	of	as	being	‘good	for’	something	–unlike	the	rose	or	the	seashell.	This	
insistence—and	 the	 theory	 of	 the	 special	 aesthetic	 attitude--	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	
sensory	 bias	 theory.	 In	 aesthetic	 experience,	 cerebral	 mechanisms	 are	 accidentally	
triggered	by	sensory	presentations	having	in	many	cases	nothing	to	do	with	survival	and	
reproduction.,	yet	triggering	the	liking	and	wanting	responses.	What	we	want	from	the	
beautiful	 object	 is	 to	 experience	 it	where	 ‘experiencing’	 can	 be	 distinguished	 to	 some	
extent	from	using.	xiii		
	
Recognising	 that	 aesthetic	 taste	 precedes	 production,	we	 can	 account	 for	 the	 cultural	
phenomena	 Miller	 and	 Dutton	 describe	 without	 introducing	 gratuitous	 hypothesis	 A.		
Tastes	were	latently	there	and	human	beings,	with	all	their	ingenuity	and	dexterity,	then	
discovered	how	to	 tap	 into	 them	for	personal	gratification	and	social	 rewards.	Chance	
inventions:	 the	 cooking	 of	 food,	 metal	 technology,	 horticvulture	 and	 agriculture,	
omnivorousness,	 left	 these	big	brained,	dexterous	people	with	plenty	of	 time	on	 their	
hands.	Once	they	had	acquired	certain	technologies	and	leisure,	humans	moved	on	from	
decorating	themselves	to	decorating	pots,	weaving	patterns,	featherwork,	metal	jewelry,	
later	 architecture,	 tiling,	 wall	 painting.	 Socalled	 primitive	 art	 replicates	 the	 building	
forces	 of	 nature	 in	 its	 vegetable	 and	 geometrical	 forms	 and	 where	 pigments	 are	
available	bright	colouration.			
	
These	patterns	and	colours	create	arousal,	attention,	absorption,	and	pleasure	because	
they	 are	 fitted	 to	 the	 human	 nervous	 system	 which	 makes	 use	 of	 an	 underlying	
geometry	 for	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 visible	 world.‘Artist’	 became	 a	 special	
occupational	 category	 in	ancient	urban	civilisations,	and	experimentation	and	cultural	
exchange	resulted	in	people	happening	on	new	ways	to	make	things	and	discovering	by	
trial	 and	 error	 how	 to	 unlock	 in	 human	 minds	 arousal,	 interest,	 aesthetic	 shivers,	
feelings	of	being	taken	into	the	work	and	transcendence,	a	 loss	of	the	normal	sense	of	
self,	that	characterise	the	experience	of	fine	art.			
	
If	metals	had	higher	melting	points	 than	 they	do;	 if	animals	had	proved	 impossible	 to	
domesticate,	 there	 would	 not	 be	 wealth	 and	 poverty,	 slavery,	 money	 and	 means	 of	
transport	 other	 than	walking.	 There	would	 be	 no	 fine	 art.	 	 But	 there	 probably	would	
have	been	and	would	still	be	clothing,	 jewelry,	mutilation,	and	 face	and	body	painting,	
and	hairdressing	as	biotic	advertisement	expressing	group	membership,	clan	identity,	as	
well	 as	 mate	 eligibility.	 There	 is	 a	 universal	 human	 insistence	 on	 doing	 something	
considered	artistic	or	aesthetically	preferable—making	it	special—as	Ellen	Dissannayke	
[Dissanayeke	 1995:	 39-63)	 says--	 with	 hair,	 face,	 and	 body:	 tattooing,	 scarification,	
jewelry,	 hairdressing	 and	 headgear,	 genital	 cutting,	 to	 the	 point	 of	 what	 we	 consider	
mutilation.	It	would	be	interesting	to	know	whether	a	group	of	children	abandoned	on	a	
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desert	 island	 but	 provided	 with	 the	 means	 of	 survival	 would	 discover	 the	 arts	 of	
personal	adornment	and	develop	the	same	liking	for	flowers,	birds	and	shells	that	Kant	
thought	 entirely	 spontaneous	 and	 untutored.	 In	 some	 cases,	 decoration	 seems	 to	 be	
learned	 from	 the	birds.	Andrew	Strathern	 reports	 that	members	of	 the	Melpa	 tribe	of	
Papua	 New	 Guinea	 contrive	 their	 costumes,	 dances	 an	 songs	 to	 imitate	 the	 bird	 of	
paradise	(	2013:	304-5).	
	
The	concept	of	 the	extended	phenotype,	 so	 illuminating	 in	 some	respects,	 can	 lead	us	
into	silliness.	Are	skyscrapers	and	theatre	tickets	are	elements	of	the	human	extended	
phenotype	 providing	 protection	 from	 the	 sometimes	 lethal	 elements	 and	 helping	 to	
induce	mating	behaviour?	If	the	underlying	capabilities	and	interests	that	lead	people	to	
make	and	use	these	things	were	not	heritable,	one	might	argue,	they	would	not	appear	
in	successive	generations.	They	are	optional,	comes	the	reply:	our	species	has	done	and	
can	 do	 without,	 but	 then	 under	 some	 conditions	 animals	 can	 do	 without	 their	
customary	nests,	burrows,	and	dams	too.			I	see	no	way	of	drawing	a	sharp	line	around	
the	 extended	 phenotype	 but	 for	 the	 arguments	 of	 Miller	 and	 Dutton	 about	 sexual	
selection	 to	 work,	 artistic	 productions	 of	 human	 beings	 will	 need	 to	 be	 more	 like	
feathers	and	less	like	theatre	tickets,	and	I	have	argued	that	they	are	not.	.				
	
	
III.			
	
The	question	remains:	how	should	we	regard	the	‘institutional’	human	artworld	with	its	
professional	 artists,	 competitions,	 fees,	 and	 prizes,	 and	 devoted	 connoisseurs	 and	
collectors	 as	 related	 to	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 biotic	 display	 and	 evaluation?	 Prum’s	
artworlds	 are	 inhabited	 by	 birds,	 lizards,	 fish,	 butterflies	 and	 insects,	 not	 our	 nearest	
nonhuman	ancestors.	Our	nearest	primate	relatives—the	chimpanzees--	do	not	appear	
to	engage	in	sexual	selection	for	ornament.		So	it	seems	impossible	to	argue	that	there	is	
some	kind	of	evolution	towards	conscious	control	over	producing	beauty	–perhaps	with	
bowerbirds	 in	 the	middle--	 in	 evolutionary	 history	 that	 puts	 us	 on	 a	 continuum	with	
birds.	xiv		
	
Outside	of	fine	art,	a	very	recent	innovation	in	human	history,	but,	as	I	mentioned,	the	
one	 that	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 the	 special	 discipline	 of	 Hegelian	 aesthetics,	 most	 human	
artistry	was	both	beautiful	and	functional.		Display	could	and	still	can	signal	class,	rank	
(hence	 the	 existence	 of	 sumptuary	 laws)	 religious	 identification	 (turbans),	
invulnerability	 (armour)	 danger	 (swords,	 wedding	 rings)	 priestliness	 or	 occupation,	
(uniforms),	 rings	or	bound	hair	or	 shaved	heads	 (marital	 status),	 or	mark	 ceremonial	
holidays	 as	Christmas	 sweaters	or	black	 tie	dinners,	 or	 just	 attitudes	 to	 life,	 like	Goth	
makeup	 or	 motorcycle-gear.	 Such	 display	 is	 evaluated	 for	 appropriateness,	 and	
sometimes-often—for	 beauty	 or	 charm.	 	 Only	 when	 but	 whenever	 adornment	 and	
decoration	is	meant	to	arouse,	please,	and	attract,	and	when	there	is	a	possibility	that	it	
does	not	do	so	because	of	the	tastes	of	the	observer,	is	it	aesthetic.	
	
Aesthetic	 assessors	 come	 to	 human	 manufactured	 works	 affected	 by	 their	 internal	
wiring,	by	biases,	 sensory	acuity	 and	emotional	dispositions,	previous	experience	and	
cultural	learning,		
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As	 in	nonhuman	aesthetic	progress,	which	can	be	rapid	as	 forms	and	preferences	 in	a	
population	 shift	 [	 	 	 	 	 	 ],	 there	 is	 coevolution	of	 observers’	 appreciation	and	producers	
innovations:	 the	 taste	 of	 critics	 and	 purchasers	 encourages	 certain	 forms	 and	 certain	
innovative	 forms	 succeed	 in	 getting	 themselves	 liked,	 so	 that	 preferences	 sprwad	
through	the	population.	[Prum						]		
	
A	 connoisseur	 class	 develops	 that	 proposes	 authoritative	 judgements	 on	 the	 relative	
value	 of	 fine	 art	 objects.	 Their	 judgement	 is	 ‘better’	 than	 that	 of	 the	 naıv̈e	 observer	
because	it	is	based	on	a	wider	class	of	comparisons,	harsher	scrutiny,	and	is	supported	
by	articulatable	‘reasons.’			The	notion	that	beauty	is	an	objective	feature	of	some	objects	
arises	from	the	conflation	or	commingling	of	two	valid	observations:	 first	that	there	is	
virtually	universal	 liking	 for	 some	 forms	of	biotic	display	 and	 light	 and	 colour	 effects,	
and	second	that	there	can	be	a	great	deal	of	convergence	in	certain	connoisseur	classes.		
	
In	 closing,	 I	 return	 briefly	 to	 the	 Hegelian	 objection	 that	 ‘aesthetic	 significance’	
dependent	 on	 ideas	 not	 ‘beauty’	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 appreciation	 of	 art	 vs.	 the	
appreciation	 of	 nature	 and	 that	 objects	 that	 are	 ‘ugly’	 can	 be	 highly	 significant—my	
examples	were	the	Venus	of	Willendorf	and	most	paintings	by	Francis	Bacon.		
	
No	 one	 will	 doubt	 dispute	 that	 these	 objects	 are	 a)	 produced	 for	 evaluation;	 the	
fabricator	of	the	first	was	trying	to	make	it	come	out	some	way,	and	the	fabricator	of	the	
second	was	making	something	for	exhibition	an	sale.	Also,	they	are	arresting,	and	they	
are	 so	because	 they	are	novel	objects	 for	us	 that	 	 (along	with	dramatic	 tragedies)	 tap	
into	emotional	and	cognitive	systems	designed	for	real	life,	including	disgust	and	fear,	as	
those	 little	white	 feathered	 caps	 apparently	 tapped	 into	 the	 finches’	 sensory	 systems.		
Human	 made	 art	 is	 experienced	 as	 ‘transformative’	 especially	 when	 there	 is	 some	
element	of	horror	and	fear	involved	because	we	are	transfixed	and	have	the	impression	
that	 there	 is	 something	 to	 be	 learned	 from	 these	 new	 appearances,	which	 the	 critic’s	
account	of	them	may	or	may	not	be	able	to	explain.		
	
Although	 I	 took	 strenuous	 issue	with	Wollheim’s	 claim	 that	 beauty	 in	 nature	 and	 the	
explanation	 of	 beauty	 in	 nature	 is	 derivative	 rather	 than	 the	 ground	 of	 all	 aesthetic	
appreciation,	evaluation,	and	explanation,	there	is	something	right	about	it	that	emerges	
in	the	contrast	between	Sei	Shonagon’s	description	of	her	experience	and	Alfred	Russel	
Wallace’s	description	of	his.		
	
The	Lady	Shonagon	belonged	to	a	court	culture	that	with	an	abundance	of	 leisure	and	
no	real	work	paid	meticulous	attention	 to	costumes,	poetic	and	epistolary	expression,	
the	 exchange	 of	 gifts	 and	 paintings.	 	 The	 phenomenon	 she	 describes	 of	 a	 spiderweb	
hung	 with	 drops	 of	 dew	 is	 probably	 not	 an	 example	 of	 biotic	 display,	 though	 the	
chrysanthemums	are.		
	
I	assert	that	with	some	hesitation	because	for	all	we	know	the	symmetry	of	spiderwebs	
exerts	 an	 attraction	 via	 its	 effect	 on	 the	 brain	 of	 the	 fly	 that	 is	 lured	 by	 the	 exciting		
appearance	of	 the	web	 rather	 than	simply	happening	 to	 fly	 into	 it.	 	But	 in	Shonagon’s	
word	portrait,	the	spiderwebs	are	tattered,	the	flowers	are	dripping,	the	scene	itself	has	
a	certain	elegiac	mood	and	could	not	qualify	as	a	display	that	could	have	been	an	object	
of	selection.		Further,	in	the	absence	of	considerable	practice	in	adorning,	arranging	and	
judging,	the	scene	would	not	have	been	noticed	or	evaluated	by	a	human	being.			
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Wallace,	although	he	is	responding	to	a	biotic	display	that	was	shaped	by	evolutionary	
forces,	in	other	contexts,	having	to	do	with	the	appreciation	of	landscape,	often	seems	to	
be	drawing	on	his	experiences	with	fine	art	in	responding	to	nature.	In	his	description	of	
the	Malay	Archipelago	he	evinces	his	familiarity	with	travelogues	and	illustrations	and	
refers	to	scenes	frequently	as	‘picturesque.’	.xv	Even	here	the	term	‘velvet’	(other	writers	
on	insect	coloration	are	apt	to	reach	for	terms	like	’jewel-like’	imports	a	term	from	the	
‘higher’	arts.			
	
The	experiences	and	resulting	descriptions	of	beautiful	nature	 in	 the	quoted	passages	
are	 then	 influenced	 by	 existing	 background	 practice	 in	 cultural	 traditions	 of	 making,	
noticing,	 and	describing	and	are	unthinkable	 in	 the	absence	of	 such	 traditions.	 	But	 it	
was	never	my	intention	to	question	that.	 	My	aim	was	simply	to	understand	fine	art	as	
an	especially	deliberate	and	conscious	form	of	display	implying	a	co-ordination	between	
the	 producer	 and	 the	 evaluator	 –who	 in	 the	 human	 case	 are	 collapsed	 into	 the	 same	
organism,	that	in	a	wide	variety	of	contexts	in	the	bioworld	operates	unconsciously	but	
effectively.		
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.		The	sexual	swellings	of	female	chimpanzees	advertise	fertility	periodically	but	it	is	not	
clear	that	they	are	objects	of	assessment	xvi			
																																																								
ii	 Thus	 	 Stephen	 Davies	 criticizes	 Ellen	 Dissanayke	 Dissanayake	 ditches	 the	
greater	part	of	art’s	artiness	and	intellectual	value.	And	she	becomes	vulnerable	
to	 the	 charge	 she	 makes	 against	 other	 anthropologists	 and	 evolutionary	
psychologists:	 that	 they	 deal	with	 .	 .	 .	 precursors	 or	 ingredients	 of	 art	 and	 the	
aesthetic	rather	than	with	the	developed	behaviour.	(131-132)	
Valery		
ii		
iii	Though	Darwin	cited	several	instances	of	‘tamed	or	domestic	birds,	belonoing	to	distinct	species,	which	
have	become	absolutely	fascinated	with	each	other’	and	gone	on	to	breed	(2004:	466)		
iv	[Takahashi	et	al.	2007:1209]	‘	Combined	with	previous	results,	our	findings	indicate	
that	the	peacock’s	train	(1)	is	not	the	universal	target	of	female	choice,	(2)	shows	small	
variance	among	males	across	populations	and	(3)	based	on	current	physiological	
knowledge,	does	not	appear	to	reliably	reflect	the	male	condition.’			
	
v	Darwin	wrote	in	a	letter	of	August	31	1877		to	Wallace	on	his	chapter	 	 ‘By	the	way,	I	
doubt	whether	the	term	voluntary	in	relation	to	sexual	selection	ought	to	be	employed:	
when	a	man	is	fascinated	by	a	pretty	girl	it	can	hardly	be	called	voluntary,	and	I	suppose	
that	 female	 animals	 are	 charmed	 or	 excited	 in	 nearly	 the	 same	manner	 by	 the	 gaudy	
males’	[Marchant,	ed.	1916		I:299]			
	
vi	This	was	stated	in	an	article	written	for	the	World	Magazine	;	it	is	quoted	from	the	(indignant)	editorial	
in	the	Humanitarian	Review		Los	Angeles	CA	August	1910.		
vii	As	Prum	notes,	the	‘aesthetics	of	nature’	typically	does	not	distinguish	between	the	
abiotic	beauties	such	as	that	of	a	starry	night,	or	certain	land	forms	and	biotic	nbeauity.	
(2012:814-5)of		
viii	It	is	clear	that	in	human	societies	people	are	both	choosy	and	needy,	in	varying	
proportions	and	in	ways	addressed	to	different	aspects	of	their	lives,	and	this	is	the	case	
with	other	animals	as	well:	mating	involves	costs	and	risks,	but	is	necessary.			
ix		AI	101.		He	is	criticising	Steven	Pinker		p.	101..		
x	Down,	Bromley,	Kent,	S.E.	March	22,	1869.	
xi	Where	1)	and	2)	are	concerned,	there	are	alternatives	that	are	more	widely	accepted	
on	 which	 large	 brains	 with	 certain	 perceptual	 biases	 were	 selected	 for	 with	 artistic,	
mathematical	 and	 other	 competencies	 emerging	 as	 by	 products	 of	 cerebral	 size	 and	
organization.	 	One	such	proposal	 is	 the	Cosmides	and	Tooby	view	that	 "The	mind	 is	a	
neural	 computer,	 fitted	 by	 natural	 selection	with	 combinational	 algorithms	 for	 causal	
and	 probabilistic	 reasoning	 about	 plants,	 animals,	 objects	 and	 people."	 Another	 is	
Kristen	Hawkes’	grandmother	‘	hypothesis,	xiaccording	to	which	there	was	selection	for	
post-fertility	 longevity	 and	 co-operative	 breeding,	 and	 this	 required	 large	 brains	 that	
could	outlast	dietary	neurotoxins,	degenerative	diseases	and	accidents.	xi	
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xii	 In	peacocks,	one	might	add,	the	potential	for	a	fancy	tail	 is	possessed	by	both	males	
and	females,	but	under	hormonal	control.	If	Miller	were	correct,	it	ought	to	be	possible	
to	suppress	male	aesthetic	display	by	giving	them	birth	control	pills.	
	
xiii	Some	writers	trace	our	aesthetic	liking	to	survival	related	concerns:	we	like	pictures	of	lakes,	open	
landscapes,	beautiful	women	and	men,	ripe	fruit,	and	the	analysis	of	the	sublime	introduces	survival	
related	concerns	–‘bold	overhanging	rocks,	storms	at	sea,	battles,	and	so	on.		[Kant			]		Thje	artists	exploits	
our	fear	of	such	‘real	things’	to	give	us	an	aesthetic	experience	in	a	condition	of	safety	or	a	condition	of	
permanence	and	accessibility	when	these	thigns	are	lacking	in	real	life.		
	
		
xiv	What	has	not	been	explained	is	why	dimorphism	with	male	ornament	is	common	in	
birds,	 insects,	 lizards,	and	fish	but	less	common	in	mammals.	 	The	suggestion	that	this	
must	have	to	do	with	the	XY	system	of	mammalian	sex	determination	vs.	the	ZZ	system	
of	birds	and	butterflies	and	lizards	is	intriguing	but	there	are	conflicting	data.	
	
	
xv	vThis	was	my	first	view	of	an	active	volcano,	but	pictures	and	panoramas	have	so	
impressed	such	things	on	one's	mind,	that	when	we	at	length	behold	them	they	seem	
nothing	extraordinary.	
	
	
xvi	The	evolution	of	exaggerated	sexual	swellings	in	primates	and	the	graded-signal	
hypothesis	CHARLES	L.	NUNN	ANIMAL	BEHAVIOUR,	1999,	58,	229–246	
